
Electoral pacts and the constitution

A briefing note

Andrew Blick

THE

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An electoral Pact between Greens, Labour, and Liberal Democrats could deprive the Conservative Party of office. It might, in turn, bring about major changes in the United Kingdom (UK) constitution itself. Last month's elections have prompted increased interest in the idea of an electoral pact between Opposition parties, aimed at defeating the Conservatives. At present the Conservatives enjoy structural and political advantages that aid their chances of maintaining a comfortable majority in the House of Commons, despite significantly more than 50 per cent of electors voting for other parties at general elections (as is normal under the UK system). However, the Conservatives' electoral performance would be weakened to the extent that non-Conservative voters coalesced behind a single opposition candidate in individual parliamentary constituencies. One means of bringing this outcome about would be through some kind of electoral pact. A group of parties could agree to give each other clear runs against the Conservatives, to encourage a consolidation of the non-Conservative vote behind a single parliamentary candidate in each constituency. It seems likely that an agreed objective of such a Pact would be electoral reform, moving to a more proportional means of determining the composition of the House of Commons. Such a goal, were it achieved, would have radical implications for the operation of the UK constitution.

The targeted non-contestation of seats has a firm historical place in the UK political-constitutional repertoire. Within the context of the 'First-Past-the-Post' (FPTP) or Single Member Plurality system used for elections to the House of Commons, it can potentially make a significant difference to the outcome. This practice can take the form of more informal and unilateral arrangements – as when the Brexit Party chose not to run in Conservative-held seats in 2019. Alternatively, it can involve agreements or pacts, for instance that between the Liberals and the embryonic Labour Party (then the Labour Representation Committee) in the 1900s; and the 'coupon' election of 1918 and the National arrangement of 1931, both of which saw governing groups within which the Conservative Party was prominent achieve overwhelming victories. At the 2019 General Election, the Green Party, the Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru operated a 'Unite to Remain' Pact in 60 seats in England and Wales (in which Labour, notably, did not participate). Pacts (along with other comparable techniques) are, therefore, an established practice by which it is possible to maximise the efficient deployment of votes under FPTP, and in this sense are important to an understanding of the constitution and how it works in practice. Given the present salience of this idea, the electoral prospects for a Pact in the contemporary environment, and what it might lead to, are issues meriting attention.

To appreciate the significance of the Pact concept more fully, it is necessary to consider the role of FPTP in the UK political system. The employment of FPTP for elections to the Commons is a distinctive, defining and controversial feature of the UK constitution. Arguments for and against this method of determining the composition of the primary chamber of the United Kingdom (UK) Parliament are well-rehearsed. But whatever position one takes in this debate, what is indisputable is that FPTP frequently leads to a single party that secured well under half of the votes cast in the General Election winning an absolute majority in the Commons. Two examples among many help illustrate this point. At the 2019

General Election, the Conservative Party won 56.2 per cent of the seats with 43.6 per cent of the total vote. In May 2005, Labour was able to achieve 55 per cent of seats on only 35.2 per cent of votes.

This phenomenon is significant in itself. Its importance is magnified because of what is at stake. Under the UK system, having a majority in the Commons is of pronounced importance. It is the senior chamber in Parliament. While the Lords is willing and able to assert itself up to a point, the Commons is – in law and through convention – clearly the more powerful of the two. Ascendancy within the Commons, then, is a route to predominance within Parliament. Furthermore, given the nature of the ‘unwritten’ or ‘uncodified’ UK constitution, Parliament is in a position of exceptional importance. It can in theory accomplish virtually any legal objective through passing an Act. While various practical, political and moral limitations upon its power may exist, there is no higher law set out in a constitutional text to constrain the UK Parliament. In as far as the established doctrine of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ prevails, all other institutions – such as the courts and the devolved legislatures – are ultimately subordinate to it.

Though never all-powerful in practice, an administration with a secure Commons majority can accomplish much. One use it can make of its power is to alter the constitutional rules themselves. In so doing, it might pursue objectives that some regard as improper – for instance, if they are seen as intended to improve the governing party’s chances of continued electoral success, to maintain its purchase on power. There is arguably potential for more serious abuse than has occurred up to now. That it has not taken place could be attributable to factors such as good fortune or cultural characteristics, the indefinite maintenance of which cannot be guaranteed.

The FPTP system, and its interaction with other aspects of the constitution, is both significant and arguably problematic. A pessimistic way of viewing this relationship is that it provides access to a disproportionately large amount of authority via a disproportionately small amount of electoral support. Such a tendency is less objectionable if accompanied by regular changeovers in the group that holds power. But often it is not. In the period since 1945, the UK has seen prolonged periods of single party dominance – 1951-1964 (Conservative); 1979-1997 (Conservative); and 1997-2010 (Labour). The Conservative Party today has been in office, in coalition or alone, since 2010. It is entirely plausible that it could still do so at least until late in the present decade.

A system that offers such rewards is resistant to reform. Those who are in a position to change it lack an incentive to do so, since they are its beneficiaries. When a referendum was held on the possibility of moving away from FPTP in 2011, the model on offer was the Alternative Vote, which – like FPTP – is not proportional. In any case, AV was heavily defeated. Were a shift to a more proportional system achieved, however, it would be likely to have extensive consequences. It would be important in itself, changing the relationship between votes cast and seats won at elections. But its impact would be likely to extend well beyond this immediate (though important) issue. The nature of electoral accountability and

representation, for instance would become different. Some kind of reconfiguration in the party system would seem likely, along with the normalisation of multi-party deals underpinning governments. These outcomes would, in turn, be likely to lead to further constitutional changes, and a cultural shift in UK politics, in which there was increased emphasis upon negotiation and trade-off, as opposed to zero-sum, winner-takes-all competition.

It is worth considering the circumstances in which a group committed to a change in the voting system might come to power. Success under FPTP is often attributable to a large extent to the way in which the votes that the winner *does not receive* divide between different parties. For instance, in 1979 the Conservative Party achieved a vote share of 43.9 per cent, securing 53.4 per cent of seats in the Commons. At the following General Election in 1983, its total proportion of votes cast fell slightly, to 42.4 per cent. Yet it increased its percentage of constituencies won to 61.1 per cent. A reason for this change was that, in 1983, a large portion of non-Conservative votes were split fairly evenly between Labour and the newly formed Liberal/Social Democratic Party Alliance, which had not existed in this form in 1979 (27.6 per cent and 25.4 per cent respectively).

In a different context, the Conservative Party in 2019 also benefited from the way in which non-Conservative votes spread between different parties. In 2017, the Conservatives won 48.8 per cent of seats on 42.4 per cent of votes cast. In 2019, a slight increase to 43.6 per cent of the popular vote yielded 56.2 per cent of seats in the Commons. In 2019, the Labour vote dropped by 7.8 per cent on 2017 to 32.2 per cent; while the Liberal Democrats in 2019 won 11.5 per cent; and the Green Party 2.7 per cent. The combined vote of these three opposition parties was 46.4 per cent – not a majority, but larger than that received by the Conservatives.¹ The disproportionate FPTP system meant that these relative levels of support were not reflected in the results of the election. But an electoral arrangement of some kind between these three parties would offer a potential means of changing the outcome. Such a Pact would require concessions on all sides, and it is likely that it would involve Labour committing itself to support the introduction of a proportional representation system. In other words, it would be an attempt to succeed within the existing model, not as an end in itself, but as a means of replacing it.

With the proposition of a Green/Labour/Liberal Democrat Pact in mind, the Constitution Society commissioned opinion research to assess the electoral prospects for such an agreement. This polling is valuable because it offers insight into how voters might respond to a Pact, and the possible consequences. It helps answer some important questions. To what extent would people aligned with parties to a Pact that were not running in a given seat vote for the Pact party that was running a candidate, even though not their most preferred option? A related set of questions involve the possibility of differential turnout. Would the existence of a Pact drive higher turnout among those inclined towards one of the Pact parties, because

¹ The Scottish National Party received 3.9 per cent; and the Brexit Party 2.0 per cent. The remaining votes split between parties including Plaid Cymru and the various Northern Ireland entities.

they saw a greater chance of success? Or might they dislike the idea of a Pact and be discouraged? Would Conservative supporters be more likely to turn out as a reaction against a Pact? Or would they be demotivated because they saw less chance of Conservative victory? It is on questions of this type, answered in a given political context, that the ability of a Pact to succeed – and potentially go on to change the UK constitution – would turn.

For the purposes of our analysis, we assumed an agreement between Greens, Labour and Liberal Democrats that would involve only one of the three parties running a candidate in every constituency in England and Wales. All three parties would encourage their supporters to vote for the Pact candidate in every seat. We also assumed that Plaid Cymru were not part of the Pact in Wales; and that the Pact did not apply at all in Scotland or Northern Ireland.

In our model, the method used to select the party that would stand in each of England and Wales's 573 constituencies would be as follows (we have used 2019 results and existing constituencies for our calculations; though the next General Election is likely to be fought on different boundaries):

- If a Pact party was elected to the seat in 2019, then that party was selected for that seat.
- Of the remaining seats, one seat in 16 (e.g., 6%) was selected for the Greens, based on the Greens' vote share in 2019. The selected seats had to contain a fair and even variety of 'winnability'.
- Of the remaining seats, seats were selected for Labour and the Liberal Democrats depending on which party received more votes in 2019. (See Appendix 3 for a full list of seat selections.)

The seat selection model used for our poll assumed Labour and the Liberal Democrats standing aside for the Greens in a number of otherwise competitive seats. There might be resistance to such a concession at some level from within these parties. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 2, the poll indicates that the Green Party would win several of these seats, with Labour and Liberal Democrat voters willing to support the Greens in certain constituencies. Furthermore, Labour and the Liberal Democrats would make gains of their own elsewhere. A Pact could well also be attractive from the point of view of all sitting non-Conservative MPs, since it would seem to strengthen their incumbency.

Using the seat allocation methodology outlined above, the allocation would be:

Table 1: assumed seat allocation

Pact Party	Incumbent seats	Non-incumbent selected seats
LAB	202	267
LIB	7	73
Green	1	23

Within this framework, a large-scale multi-level regression and post stratification (MRP) poll was conducted involving more than 14,000 respondents.

The poll asked residents in England and Wales whether and how they intend to vote if there were an imminent general election and there was an electoral Pact between Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Green party. (See Appendix 2 for the questions that were asked.)

A key general finding of our poll is that potential voters at whom the Pact would be aimed are receptive to the proposition, with Labour, Green and Liberal Democrat supporters apparently willing to vote for the Pact candidate in their constituency.

The headline table of predicted results is as follows (see Appendix 1 for a full list of seats predicted to change hands):

Table 2: seat changes under Pact using poll results

Party	2019	Predicted with Pact	Change
CON	365	307	-58
LAB	203	239	+36
SNP	48	48	0
LIB	11	25	+14
Green	1	9	+8
Plaid	4	4	0

On this basis, an electoral Pact would see the Conservatives losing 58 seats, enough to deprive them of their majority. All three of the Pact parties stand to gain from the arrangement. Labour would win back several of the so-called ‘Red Wall’ seats it lost in 2019, including Blyth Valley, Heywood and Middleton, and Leigh. The Liberal Democrats would also manage to take seats which were targeted in 2019 without success, such as Guildford, Cheltenham and Winchester. It would also see the Greens making significant gains, moving from one to nine seats.

In Wales, the poll suggests that Plaid would hold its four seats, despite the existence of the Pact. Theoretically, the Pact parties would have a sufficient number of seats to form a government, were they able to secure support from the SNP and Plaid Cymru. Were the popularity of the government to decline in coming years, a Pact could be electorally more successful still.

Some caveats are necessary. The Boundary Commission has produced initial proposals and, as noted above, we can assume that the next election will be fought after changes to constituency boundaries are implemented in 2023. It is unclear at this stage what impact this will have on the electoral prospects of the different parties, or a putative Pact.

Furthermore, if there were a Pact, the platform the parties involved were running on would be highly significant. As already mentioned, most predictions assume that the Greens and the Liberal Democrats would require some form of proportional representation as a condition of their involvement. But would the parties run on a joint policy platform beyond this stipulation? Political circumstances and negotiation will determine the answer to this question, and many of the others posed by the prospect of an electoral alliance. However, this research indicates that, in present circumstances, supporters of the Labour, Liberal Democrat and Green parties are amenable to voting for a Pact candidate, even if the candidate is not drawn from their own party. Depending on how the seats are allocated, all three parties could secure a 'win' from a Pact. In purely electoral terms then, a Pact between Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens is a viable proposition – one which, if taken up, would be likely to lead to the major constitutional change of an alternative parliamentary voting system. Moreover, this polling was carried out at a time of relative popularity and political strength for the Conservative government. Even at this point, it would be – according to our analysis – unable to retain a Commons majority against a Pact. If there were at some point a weakening of the Conservative position in public estimation, then a Pact might be more electorally effective still.

Electoral pacts or similar arrangements have been used on numerous occasions in UK political history, and have sometimes been highly successful. Whether – and if so on what terms – the parties focused on here are able to reach an agreement; and if the leaders of the Pact were able to present it in an appealing way to voters, are matters of politics. But there appears to be potential on which the Opposition parties might seek to capitalise. These are matters to which we will return.

Dr. Andrew Blick, Senior Adviser to the Constitution Society, is Head of Department of Political Economy and Reader in Politics and Contemporary History, King's College London.

Technical Details

Find Out Now polled 14, 596 GB adults in England and Wales online between 4-6 June 2021. The sample was weighted to be representative by gender, age, social grade, other demographics and past voting patterns. Regression techniques were used to infer projected seat results.

Find Out Now is a member of the British Polling Council and abides by its rules.

Regression Polling

Modern polling analysis often uses statistical regression techniques to get more accurate and geographically detailed results. Also called MRP (multi-level regression and post stratification) they have been used successfully by Electoral Calculus and other pollsters to predict general elections, local elections and the 2019 European elections.

These techniques work by spotting patterns between people's demographic characteristics and their likelihood to vote for various parties.

Electoral Calculus

Electoral Calculus is a political consultancy specialising in quantitative analysis and modelling for electoral and other market research projects. Its pre-poll prediction for the 2019 general election was the most accurate published forecast. It was founded by Martin Baxter, its CEO.

Find Out Now

Find Out Now gathers poll responses from Pick My Postcode, a daily panel from 2.6 million members. Highly profiled respondents can be targeted instantly, and at scale to deliver reliable results fast.

More than 73 million responses have been received to Find Out Now's polls since it launched in November 2018. Find Out Now are Market Research Society Company Partners and a member of the British Polling Council.

Appendix 1 – List of seats predicted to change hands

Table shows current and predicted winning party in 58 seats which the poll predicts would change hands.

Seat Name	Current	Prediction
Altrincham and Sale West	CON	LAB
Birmingham Northfield	CON	LAB
Blyth Valley	CON	LAB
Bolton North East	CON	LAB
Bournemouth East	CON	Green
Bournemouth West	CON	Green
Burnley	CON	LAB
Bury North	CON	LAB
Bury South	CON	LAB
Cambridgeshire South	CON	LIB
Cambridgeshire South East	CON	LIB
Carshalton and Wallington	CON	LIB
Cheadle	CON	LIB
Chelsea and Fulham	CON	LIB
Cheltenham	CON	LIB
Chingford and Woodford Green	CON	LAB
Chipping Barnet	CON	LAB
Cities of London and Westminster	CON	LIB
Colne Valley	CON	LAB
Darlington	CON	LAB
Derby North	CON	LAB
Dewsbury	CON	LAB
Durham North West	CON	LAB
Finchley and Golders Green	CON	LIB
Gedling	CON	LAB
Guildford	CON	LIB
Hazel Grove	CON	LIB
Hendon	CON	LAB
Heywood and Middleton	CON	LAB
High Peak	CON	LAB
Hitchin and Harpenden	CON	LIB
Keighley	CON	LAB
Kensington	CON	LAB
Leigh	CON	LAB
Lewes	CON	Green
Lincoln	CON	LAB
Northampton South	CON	LAB
Pudsey	CON	LAB
Reigate	CON	Green
Rushcliffe	CON	LAB
Somerset North	CON	Green
Southport	CON	LAB
Stoke-on-Trent Central	CON	LAB
Stroud	CON	Green
Truro and Falmouth	CON	Green
Warrington South	CON	LAB

Watford	CON	LAB
Wimbledon	CON	LIB
Winchester	CON	LIB
Woking	CON	LIB
Wycombe	CON	LAB
Aberconwy	CON	LAB
Bridgend	CON	LAB
Clwyd South	CON	LAB
Delyn	CON	LAB
Vale of Clwyd	CON	LAB
Vale of Glamorgan	CON	Green
Wrexham	CON	LAB

Appendix 2 – Poll questions

Respondents were asked two questions. The first was a general question of likelihood to vote.

Q1. We know that many people in your area didn't vote in the last general election. How likely do you think you are to vote in the next general election on a scale from 0 to 10? (10 - certain to vote, 0 - certain not to vote)

The second question depends on the constituency that the respondent lives in. In general terms, the question has the format

Q2. Suppose at the next general election that all the usual political parties are standing in your seat except that the [OTHER PARTY1] and [OTHER PARTY2] have agreed not to stand and are asking their supporters to vote [SELECTED PARTY]. Which party, if any, would you vote for, in this general election?

This had three particular instances, depending on which pact party was selected for the relevant seat. These question variants were:

Q2A. [For voters in seats selected for Labour] Suppose at the next general election that all the usual political parties are standing in your seat except that the Liberal Democrats and the Greens have agreed not to stand and are asking their supporters to vote Labour. Which party, if any, would you vote for, in this general election?

Q2B. [For voters in seats selected for the Liberal Democrats] Suppose at the next general election that all the usual political parties are standing in your seat except that Labour and the Greens have agreed not to stand and are asking their supporters to vote Liberal Democrat. Which party, if any, would you vote for, in this general election?

Q2C. [For voters in seats selected for the Green party] Suppose at the next general election that all the usual political parties are standing in your seat except that Labour and the Liberal Democrats have agreed not to stand and are asking their supporters to vote Green. Which party, if any, would you vote for, in this general election?

Respondents were not given the option of voting for a pact party which was not selected for their own seat. Respondents were given the additional option of "Would not vote" if the existence of the pact made them to decide on that.

Appendix 3 – Selected Seats

Seats selected for Labour (469 seats)

Aberavon, Aberconwy, Aldershot, Aldridge-Brownhills, Altrincham and Sale West, Alyn and Deeside, Amber Valley, Arfon, Ashfield, Ashford, Ashton under Lyne, Aylesbury, Banbury, Barking, Barnsley Central, Barnsley East, Barrow and Furness, Basildon and Billericay, Basildon South and East Thurrock, Basingstoke, Bassetlaw, Batley and Spen, Battersea, Beaconsfield, Beckenham, Bedford, Bedfordshire Mid, Bedfordshire North East, Bedfordshire South West, Bermondsey and Old Southwark, Berwick-upon-Tweed, Bethnal Green and Bow, Beverley and Holderness, Bexhill and Battle, Bexleyheath and Crayford, Birkenhead, Birmingham Edgbaston, Birmingham Erdington, Birmingham Hall Green, Birmingham Hodge Hill, Birmingham Ladywood, Birmingham Northfield, Birmingham Perry Barr, Birmingham Selly Oak, Birmingham Yardley, Bishop Auckland, Blackburn, Blackley and Broughton, Blackpool North and Cleveleys, Blackpool South, Blaenau Gwent, Blaydon, Blyth Valley, Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, Bolsover, Bolton North East, Bolton South East, Bolton West, Bootle, Boston and Skegness, Bosworth, Bracknell, Bradford East, Bradford South, Bradford West, Braintree, Brent Central, Brent North, Brentford and Isleworth, Brentwood and Ongar, Bridgend, Bridgwater and West Somerset, Brigg and Goole, Brighton Kemptown, Bristol East, Bristol North West, Bristol South, Bristol West, Broadland, Bromley and Chislehurst, Bromsgrove, Broxbourne, Broxtowe, Burnley, Burton, Bury North, Bury South, Caerphilly, Calder Valley, Camberwell and Peckham, Camborne and Redruth, Cambridge, Cambridgeshire North East, Cambridgeshire North West, Canterbury, Cardiff Central, Cardiff North, Cardiff South and Penarth, Cardiff West, Carlisle, Carmarthen East and Dinefwr, Carmarthen West and Pembrokeshire South, Castle Point, Charnwood, Chatham and Aylesford, Chester, City of, Chesterfield, Chingford and Woodford Green, Chipping Barnet, Chorley, Clacton, Cleethorpes, Clwyd South, Clwyd West, Colchester, Colne Valley, Congleton, Copeland, Corby, Cornwall South East, Coventry North East, Coventry North West, Coventry South, Crawley, Crewe and Nantwich, Croydon Central, Croydon North, Croydon South, Cynon Valley, Dagenham and Rainham, Darlington, Dartford, Daventry, Delyn, Denton and Reddish, Derby North, Derby South, Derbyshire Dales, Derbyshire Mid, Derbyshire North East, Derbyshire South, Devon Central, Devon East, Devon South West, Dewsbury, Don Valley, Doncaster Central, Doncaster North, Dorset South, Dover, Dudley North, Dudley South, Dulwich and West Norwood, Durham North, Durham North West, Durham, City of, Dwyfor Meirionnydd, Ealing Central and Acton, Ealing North, Ealing Southall, Easington, East Ham, Eddisbury, Edmonton, Ellesmere Port and Neston, Elmet and Rothwell, Eltham, Enfield North, Enfield Southgate, Epping Forest, Erewash, Erith and Thamesmead, Exeter, Fareham, Faversham and Kent Mid, Feltham and Heston, Filton and Bradley Stoke, Folkestone and Hythe, Fylde, Gainsborough, Garston and Halewood, Gateshead, Gedling, Gillingham and Rainham, Gloucester, Gosport, Gower, Grantham and Stamford, Gravesham, Great Grimsby, Great Yarmouth, Greenwich and Woolwich, Hackney North and Stoke Newington, Hackney South and Shoreditch, Halesowen and Rowley Regis, Halifax, Haltemprice and Howden, Halton, Hammersmith, Hampstead and Kilburn, Harborough, Harlow, Harrow East, Harrow West, Hartlepool, Harwich and North Essex, Hastings and Rye, Havant, Hayes and Harlington, Hemel Hempstead, Hemsworth, Hendon, Hereford and South Herefordshire, Hertford and Stortford, Hertfordshire North East, Hertfordshire South West, Hertsmere, Hexham, Heywood and Middleton, High Peak, Holborn and St Pancras, Hornchurch and Upminster, Hornsey and Wood Green, Houghton and Sunderland South, Hove, Huddersfield, Hull East, Hull North, Hull West and Hessle, Huntingdon, Hyndburn, Ilford North, Ilford South, Ipswich, Islington North, Islington South and Finsbury, Islwyn, Jarrow, Keighley, Kensington, Kettering, Kingswood, Knowsley, Lancashire West, Lancaster and Fleetwood, Leeds Central, Leeds East, Leeds North East, Leeds North West, Leeds West, Leicester East, Leicester South, Leicester West, Leicestershire North West, Leicestershire South, Leigh, Lewisham Deptford, Lewisham East, Lewisham West and Penge, Leyton and Wanstead, Lichfield, Lincoln, Liverpool Riverside, Liverpool Walton, Liverpool Wavertree, Liverpool West Derby, Llanelli, Loughborough, Louth and Horncastle, Luton North, Luton South, Macclesfield, Maidstone and The Weald, Makerfield, Maldon, Manchester Central, Manchester Gorton, Manchester Withington, Mansfield, Meriden, Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney, Middlesbrough, Middlesbrough South and Cleveland East, Milton Keynes North, Milton Keynes South, Mitcham and Morden, Monmouth, Morecambe and Lunesdale, Morley and Outwood, Neath, New Forest East, Newark, Newcastle upon Tyne Central, Newcastle upon Tyne East, Newcastle upon Tyne North, Newcastle-under-Lyme, Newport East, Newport West, Norfolk Mid, Norfolk North West, Norfolk South, Norfolk South West, Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford, Northampton North, Northampton South, Northamptonshire South, Norwich North, Norwich South, Nottingham East, Nottingham North, Nottingham South, Nuneaton, Ogmere, Old Bexley and Sidcup, Oldham East and Saddleworth, Oldham West and Royton, Orpington, Oxford East, Pendle, Penistone and Stocksbridge, Penrith and The Border, Peterborough, Plymouth Moor View, Plymouth Sutton and Devonport, Pontypridd, Poole, Poplar and Limehouse, Portsmouth North, Portsmouth South, Preseli Pembrokeshire, Preston, Pudsey, Putney, Rayleigh and Wickford, Reading East,

Reading West, Redcar, Redditch, Rhondda, Ribble South, Ribble Valley, Richmond, Rochdale, Rochester and Strood, Rochford and Southend East, Romford, Rossendale and Darwen, Rother Valley, Rotherham, Rugby, Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner, Runnymede and Weybridge, Rushcliffe, Salford and Eccles, Scarborough and Whitby, Scunthorpe, Sedgfield, Sefton Central, Selby and Ainsty, Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough, Sheffield Central, Sheffield Hallam, Sheffield Heeley, Sheffield South East, Sherwood, Shipley, Shrewsbury and Atcham, Shropshire North, Sittingbourne and Sheppey, Skipton and Ripon, Sleaford and North Hykeham, Slough, Solihull, Somerset North East, South Holland and The Deepings, South Shields, Southampton Itchen, Southampton Test, Southend West, Southport, Spelthorne, St Austell and Newquay, St Helens North, St Helens South and Whiston, Staffordshire Moorlands, Stalybridge and Hyde, Stevenage, Stockport, Stockton North, Stockton South, Stoke-on-Trent Central, Stoke-on-Trent North, Stoke-on-Trent South, Stone, Stourbridge, Streatham, Stretford and Urmston, Suffolk Central and Ipswich North, Suffolk Coastal, Suffolk South, Suffolk West, Sunderland Central, Sutton Coldfield, Swansea East, Swansea West, Swindon North, Swindon South, Tamworth, Tatton, Telford, Thanet North, Thanet South, Thirsk and Malton, Thurrock, Tiverton and Honiton, Tooting, Torfaen, Tottenham, Tynemouth, Tyneside North, Uxbridge and South Ruislip, Vale of Clwyd, Vauxhall, Wakefield, Wallasey, Walsall North, Walsall South, Walthamstow, Wansbeck, Warley, Warrington North, Warrington South, Warwick and Leamington, Warwickshire North, Washington and Sunderland West, Watford, Waveney, Weaver Vale, Wellingborough, Welwyn Hatfield, Wentworth and Dearne, West Bromwich East, West Bromwich West, West Ham, Westminster North, Weston-Super-Mare, Wigan, Wiltshire South West, Wirral South, Wirral West, Wolverhampton North East, Wolverhampton South East, Wolverhampton South West, Worcester, Worcestershire Mid, Workington, Worsley and Eccles South, Worthing East and Shoreham, Worthing West, Wrekin, The, Wrexham, Wycombe, Wyre and Preston North, Wyre Forest, Wythenshawe and Sale East, Ynys Mon, York Central, York Outer, Yorkshire East

Seats selected for Liberal Democrats (80 seats)

Arundel and South Downs, Bath, Brecon and Radnorshire, Buckingham, Cambridgeshire South, Cambridgeshire South East, Carshalton and Wallington, Ceredigion, Cheadle, Chelmsford, Chelsea and Fulham, Cheltenham, Chichester, Chippenham, Christchurch, Cities of London and Westminster, Cornwall North, Cotswolds, The, Devizes, Devon North, Devon West and Torridge, Dorset Mid and Poole North, Dorset North, Dorset West, Eastbourne, Eastleigh, Epsom and Ewell, Esher and Walton, Finchley and Golders Green, Guildford, Hampshire North East, Hampshire North West, Harrogate and Knaresborough, Hazel Grove, Henley, Hitchin and Harpenden, Horsham, Kenilworth and Southam, Kingston and Surbiton, Ludlow, Maidenhead, Meon Valley, Mole Valley, Montgomeryshire, Newbury, Newton Abbot, Norfolk North, Oxford West and Abingdon, Richmond Park, Romsey and Southampton North, Saffron Walden, Sevenoaks, St Albans, St Ives, Stratford-on-Avon, Surrey East, Surrey Heath, Surrey South West, Sussex Mid, Sutton and Cheam, Taunton Deane, Tewkesbury, Thornbury and Yate, Tonbridge and Malling, Torbay, Totnes, Tunbridge Wells, Twickenham, Wantage, Wealden, Wells, Westmorland and Lonsdale, Wiltshire North, Wimbledon, Winchester, Windsor, Witney, Woking, Wokingham, Yeovil

Seats selected for the Green Party (24 seats)

Bournemouth East, Bournemouth West, Brighton Pavilion, Bury St Edmunds, Cannock Chase, Chesham and Amersham, Forest of Dean, Hampshire East, Herefordshire North, Isle of Wight, Lewes, New Forest West, Reigate, Rutland and Melton, Salisbury, Somerset North, Somerton and Frome, Stafford, Staffordshire South, Stroud, Truro and Falmouth, Vale of Glamorgan, Witham, Worcestershire West