There are not one, but two, spectres haunting British government (to paraphrase Marx and Engels). They are two sometimes obscure but very real views on the way the British constitution is supposed to work.
The first, and usually dominant, view is that of Whitehall. It’s most-often held by those elected politicians who make it into government jobs. By those who aspire to get there themselves from the ruling party or the opposition. And by the senior civil service.
The second view is that of Westminster. More specifically some of those Members of Parliament who are not now, and probably are unlikely to ever be, in government themselves.
The Whitehall (WH) view is that government (both the elected and permanent parts) is essentially sovereign and subject to very limited constraints from Parliament, or anybody else. This view is that the ruling party has won a mandate to rule for 5 years, based on an election that awarded them with a majority of MPs. That election was between contending executives and their parties, manifestos, and candidates. Accountability is mainly for the next election. Westminster is there to endorse or refine policies as decided by Whitehall.
The Westminster (WM) view is that Parliament, or rather the Members of the House of Commons, are sovereign. Voters elect individual MPs to represent their constituencies and constituents – all of them whether they voted for them or not. Whitehall is there to carry out the will of the majority in the House, not the other way around. When there is conflict between WH and WM, it is Parliament that should prevail.
The roots of these two views lie deep in the history and evolution of the constitutional arrangements between the Monarchy, and more latterly Her or His Majesty’s Prime Minister and Government, on the one hand, and Parliament on the other. The WH view is embedded in the monarchical view of government. And although in the past couple of centuries monarchical powers have gradually passed from Monarch to Prime Minister it is still His Majesty’s Prime Minister, Government and, incidentally Civil Service. It is essentially a conflict between two unresolved views: a more monarchical view and a more republican one.
On example of this is who advises the Monarch when a constitutional issue arises involving the Prime Minister or prospective PM. Examples include who the Monarch should call upon to form a government in the event of a hung parliament (e.g in 2010). Or when the Queen might have wanted advice on whether or not to prorogue Parliament on the advice of the PM (2019).
This is when the so-called ‘Golden Triangle’ comes into play – the Monarch’s private secretary, the PM’s principle private secretary and the Cabinet Secretary. This is very much a Whitehall operation. As can be illustrated by the absence from this of the Speaker of the House of Commons (or the Lord Speaker) as key constitutional figures on the Westminster side of the divide.
We have seen this tension play out in the recent conflicts in the House of Commons over welfare reforms and benefits cuts. It was quite clear a majority of the House – including quite a few of Labour’s own MPs – wanted changes to the proposed reforms. It was common to hear Labour MPs who opposed the reforms invoking their mandate and their constituents as justification to support their rebellion against the WH line.
Meanwhile government whips deployed the usual Whitehall lines – you were elected as Labour MPs and should back your Labour government. On this occasion the government backed down and the Westminster view prevailed. This is unusual.
We also recently saw a series of such conflicts between the Boris Johnson government and the House of Commons over Brexit. David Howarth and I pointed out that this was a classic WH vs WM clash, with, for a short period, Westminster gaining the upper hand. Again, this was highly unusual. So much so that Boris Johnson sought to temporarily disband (prorogue) Parliament in order to push through his government’s policies without constraint. And Johnson deployed classic Whitehall arguments that he had a mandate to do so – 14 million votes in 2019. As though they had been cast for him, in a presidential election, rather than for individual MPs in their constituencies.
It is worth pointing out that this is not a Right versus Left issue, though. It was Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister – hardly a leftie – who reformed the House of Commons by introducing the modern, extensive, Select Committee system which had the effect of bolstering the Westminster view by strengthening parliamentary scrutiny of Whitehall. And it was a Labour government that opposed the later reforms proposed by the Wright Committee that would have pushed parliamentary scrutiny and control further forward.
The advent of departmental Select Committee’s and their gradual strengthening – including extra support provided by the parliamentary Scrutiny Unit and the (parliamentary) National Audit Office – has somewhat tilted the balance towards the Westminster view. But the fate of the Wright Committee’s proposals illustrated yet again the limits this gradual change.
So what?
So why does this ongoing tension matter now? Simply because we now have one of the most unbalanced House of Commons we have seen for a very long time. At the time of writing there are 398 Labour MPs. And the official opposition is only a third of the size of Labour. Aside from war-time coalitions and the national governments of the 1930s, this level of asymmetry is virtually unheard of.
Those “in government” are often referred to as the ‘payroll vote’. Although some are unpaid and only ministers have any real power. According to the Institute for Government, as of July 2025, the payroll vote consisted of an estimated 172 MPs: 90 ministers (including whips) in the House of Commons; 43 parliamentary private secretaries; 27 ‘mission champions’ (four of which were appointed to be PPS in March 2025); 16 Labour trade envoys. All the last three categories (82 MPs) are only ‘semi-attached’ to the government (and some rebelled or resigned over the benefits issue).
So fully outside of the government are 226 Labour MPs – over 50 more than the full possible payroll vote. But there is also scope for the 72 Lib Dem MPs to team-up with non-government Labour MPs, as we saw in the benefits controversy. So, the possible unofficial ‘opposition’ who are not tied in some way to Whitehall and therefore less likely to espouse the WH model of the constitution, numbers at least 298.
To which can be added 9 SNP, 2 Plaid Cymru and 4 Green MPs. And probably at least some of the 21 independents in the House of Commons, bringing the total possible “WM” MPs to around 320+ MPs. Or to put it another way, that is exactly half of all 640 voting MPs. (The Speaker, his two deputies and the 7 Sinn Fein MPs don’t vote).
Meanwhile the Tories – the official opposition – have been reduced to only 120 members – barely enough to fill all the shadow ministerial roles. Normally one would expect the official opposition (and assumed alternative government) to hold more to the Whitehall view, because they expect to be in Whitehall themselves at some point in the future. However, in these specific circumstances that cannot be guaranteed – there may be opportunistic reasons for the Tories to side with Labour rebels to embarrass the sitting Government. It has happened in the past.
All this tilts the balance in the Commons strongly towards those MPs who might opt, in the right circumstances, to back a more Westminster interpretation of the constitution, and their own roles, than the traditionally dominant Whitehall view.
It will be interesting to see how this plays out. Of course, not all MPs without attachments to Whitehall will adopt completely a Westminster view, much less consistently across all issues. Nor for that matter will all MPs with governmental attachments always adopt a Whitehall view. But what is clear is the scope for the Westminster view gaining ground over this parliament seems more favourable than in recent years, apart from the Brexit period. This may result in further institutional reform, such as further strengthening of the select committee system or other scrutiny mechanisms.
Colin Talbot.
Colin Talbot is Emeritus Professor of Government, University of Manchester. He also has relationships with the Cambridge Judge Business School and the Federal Trust. Colin has worked extensively with all levels of British government and public services, including being an advisor to two House of Commons Select Committees and appearing as an expert witness over two dozen times in both Houses of Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, and the Welsh Assembly. He has also advised more than a dozen other governments, from the USA to Japan.
The Constitution Society is committed to the promotion of informed debate and is politically impartial. Any views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and not those of The Constitution Society.