Introduction
Whether politics has been subject to presidentialisation or Prime Ministerialisation within the United Kingdom’s parliamentary system is an ongoing debate. In my fellowship report for the Constitution Society, I conceptualised a third alternative in this debate called the ‘semi-presidentialisation’ thesis.[1] I also explored the danger of semi-presidentialisation, which compromises democratic accountability in the name of achieving government stability. I argued that while government stability is important for economic development and societal well-being, stability without accountability undermines both goals.
My conceptualisation of ‘semi-presidentialisation’ was based on a comparison between UK prime ministerial resignations and the presidential resignation in Sri Lanka in 2022. This year both countries have a fresh opportunity to choose their executive. Voters in the UK have already made this choice by electing the Labour Party in July 2024. The Sri Lankan presidential election comes on 21 September. In this blog post, I will focus on the UK. I argue that semi-presidentialisation here continues to pose challenges against strengthening democratic accountability. In the first part of the post, I will recap the key features of semi-presidentialisation. In the second, I outline measures that need to be taken to strengthen democratic accountability and reverse semi-presidentialisation.
Features of semi-presidentialisation
The UK is the home of the Westminster parliamentary tradition where the Prime Minister and the cabinet of ministers hold office while they command the confidence of Parliament. Because the UK has an unwritten constitution, the country’s executive evolves based on conventions. Since Tony Blair, Prime Ministers have gradually amassed political power in their office at the party, electoral process and executive levels.[2] I have explained this phenomenon as the semi-presidentialisation of politics.
There are two main features of semi-presidentialisation. Firstly, the Prime Minister works with selected ministers and executive officers bypassing the scrutiny of Parliament. This is facilitated by the centralised power the Prime Minister enjoys in terms of resources and autonomy both within their party and in the electoral process.[3] This is a classic feature of the semi-presidential system, where the president draws key members of the executive from a parliament but works with weakened accountability to that parliament. An example of this aspect from the UK is how Boris Johnson removed half of Theresa May’s cabinet in 2019 and assembled ‘one of the most right-wing [cabinets] since the 1980s.’[4]This polarised cabinet ensured the Prime Minister could make decisions under minimum scrutiny. While facilitating Brexit, the unchecked discretion that the Prime Minister enjoyed led him to make many ill-advised political decisions. One example of this was when he appointed Christopher Pincher as the Deputy Chief Whip knowing that Pincher had faced previous allegations of sexual misconduct.[5] This fact came to the fore in 2022 when Pincher was charged with making sexual advances on two employees at the Carlon Club in London, which triggered an investigation by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and the Commons Committee on Standards.[6] Despite numerous scandals, the cabinet did not react until the story became ‘the Pincher affair’,[7] at which point they could no longer condone the actions of the Prime Minister in appointing Pincher without severely damaging their own political reputations.
The second feature of semi-presidentialisation is how a Prime Minister uses their control of their parliamentary majority to employ devices to resist accountability in parliament. This is a feature of the semi-presidential system because while a president is not a member of parliament, they too might control a parliament where their party commands a majority. An example of this feature in the UK is how Johnson resisted parliamentary accountability when Owen Paterson MP faced allegations of violating lobbying rules.[8] Instead of implementing the 30-day suspension recommended by the Commons Committee of Standards, Johnson intervened and used his Conservative majority to reject the sanction and to call for a reinvestigation.[9]
Johnson’s resistance against accountability in Parliament was most apparent, though, when he misled Parliament regarding the social events in Downing Street which violated COVID-19 Rules and Guidelines, rules and guidelines his government had introduced.[10] This cavalier attitude during a national health crisis exposed Johnson’s disregard for the rule of law – a cornerstone of the UK’s constitutional democracy. Not only did Johnson mislead Parliament regarding the nature of these actions, he also further misled it in trying to set the record straight after Sue Gray’s report into the subject.[11] This report found that ‘a number of these gatherings should not have been allowed to take place or to develop in the way that they did.’[12] While the Privileges Committee was in the process hearing this case, the Committee itself then came under pressure and was subject to a backlash from the MPs from the Conservative Party loyal to Johnson who tried to undermine this process of democratic accountability by accusing the Committee of being bias and politically motivated in its actions.[13]
Semi-presidentialisation allows a Prime Minister to use tools usually available to presidents to centralise executive power unto himself (or herself). Consequently, the Prime Minister is able to resist the mechanisms of democratic accountability within the parliamentary system designed to restrain their power and thus act with impunity.
Measures for reversing semi-presidentialisation
In this section, I will discuss three ways to reverse semi-presidentialisation and the extent to which the Labour government has promised to undertake such measures. First of these three are direct reforms to the executive to regulate and constrain its exercise of power. Second is democratic accountability through the parliament. Third is accountability through independent bodies i.e. fourth branch institutions. It is still too early to assess how the Labour Party will implement such measures in government, and I’ll therefore base my analysis primarily on the 2024 election-winning manifesto.
Firstly, reversing semi-presidentialisation requires reforms to the executive that have the effect of limiting the Party’s own political power through checks and balances. Kier Starmer and Labour are coming into power on promises of economic stability and resolving pressing issues with the economy, energy, national security, health and education.[14] With such formidable tasks ahead of them, limiting their own power is perhaps counterintuitive. This is likely why the election manifesto lacked specific proposals to reform the executive. This omission is glaring given the Conservative Prime Ministers they followed and the extent to which those figures resisted political accountability. significantly weakening the democratic credibility of the UK.
The Labour Party Manifesto did recognise the loss of popular trust in politics, though, and it did contain proposals for reform that seek to reorient the focus of Westminster toward serving the public.[15] However, this essentially excluded reform to the executive. While there are proposals to reform the House of Lords, the House of Commons, as well as measures to facilitate voting, there are no proposed reforms to address the power or functions of the Prime Minister or their cabinet of ministers. [16]
The other branches of government play a crucial role in holding the executive to account in the system of checks and balances. In the UK, Parliament enables executive scrutiny and in my fellowship report, I have discussed the role that parliamentary committees played in holding Johnson and his cabinet to account. The second method for reversing semi-presidentialisation, therefore, is to strengthen the existing parliamentary systems of democratic accountability. Labour’s constitutional reforms mainly focus on the House of Lords. Reforms to the House of Lords include the removal of hereditary peers and setting up mechanisms for the retirement and dismissal of Peers.[17] Labour reforms that focus on the House of Commons are limited to the establishment of the Modernisation Committee to assess and update the rules and procedures of House of Commons and an ‘immediate ban on MPs from taking paid advisory or consultancy roles.’[18] The success of the former proposal especially depends on the extent to which the Modernisation Committee focuses on the parliamentary role of executive scrutiny and the extent to which its proposals are adopted. However, there are no proposals to formalise the role of the whips, who have played a critical role in facilitating Prime Ministers’ undue influence over Parliament. An example of this was when Johnson led the parliamentary majority to pause sanctions against Owen Paterson MP.[19] However, there is potential for the proposed Modernisation Committee to take up such matters. Therefore, the success of any such proposals strengthening parliamentary oversight remains dependent largely on how willing the government is to implement them.
The third measure to reserve semi-presidentialisation is through establishing and empowering independent institutions, often called fourth branch institutions, to hold the executive to account. Fourth branch institutions are a comparatively recent development in constitutional law that emerged from the Global South. They consist of a set of independent institutions to complement the three traditional branches of the state.[20] Tarun Khaitan calls these ‘guarantor institutions’ because they uphold constitutional norms that the political branches might have less political interest to uphold.[21]There is perhaps some evidence of a version of this regarding Labour proposals to empower the Office for Budget Responsibility.
Separately, the Commission chaired by former Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown proposed ‘an Integrity & Ethics Commission to enforce the code of ministerial conduct, an Appointments Commission for merit-only appointments to public bodies, and an Anti-Corruption Commissioner’ as constitutional guarantors.[22] There is evidence of these recommendations being heeded by Labour in the proposed establishment of a new independent Ethics and Integrity Commission, with an independent chair, and an empowered Independent Advisor on Ministerial Interests to conduct investigations. [23] Peter Riddell observes that Labour has not provided details on how the commission will work, though.[24] He highlights the importance of establishing both the commission and the Advisor with independence and with accountability to Parliament.[25] Once again the success of these mechanisms depends on their institutional design.
Reforms that constrain the scope of executive power and reforms that strengthen the institutions that hold the executive to account are both equally important to halt semi-presidentialisation. Labour’s lack of proposals constraining the Prime Minister and the executive is a critical omission from the outset. While they have made several proposals on strengthening the parliamentary systems of accountability and establishing independent fourth branch institutions, the impact of these proposals in halting semi-presidentialisation depend on the extent of their implementation. While the Labour manifesto shows that they have identified the symptoms of weakened accountability, they have not paid enough attention to the structural problem of semi-presidentialisation that undermines executive accountability.
Binendri Perera.
Binendri Perera is a DPhil in Law candidate at the University of Oxford and a Constitution Society Research Fellow. She is on study leave from her position at the Department of Public & International Law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
The Constitution Society is committed to the promotion of informed debate and is politically impartial. Any views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and not those of The Constitution Society.
[1] Binendri Perera, ‘Semi-presidentialisation and executive accountability: A cautionary tale from Sri Lanka to the UK’ (The Constitution Society UK 2024) <https://consoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Semi-Presidentialisation-and-Executive-Accountability.pdf> accessed on 28 August 2024.
[2] Richard Heffernan and Paul Webb, ‘The British Prime Minister: Much More Than ‘First Among Equals’ in Thomas Poguntke, Paul Webb, The Presidentiliazation of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies (OUP 2005) 27.
[3] Thomas Poguntke, Paul Webb, ‘The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis’ in Thomas Poguntke, Paul Webb, The Presidentiliazation of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies (OUP 2005) 5.
[4] Heather Stewart, Rowena Mason, ‘Boris Johnson: new PM takes his revenge and sacks half of the cabinet’ Guardian (25 July 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jul/24/boris-johnson-takes-his-revenge-and-sacks-over-half-the-cabinet> accessed 28 August 2024.
[5] Rowena Mason, ‘Chris Pincher: a timeline of allegations and investigations’ The Guardian (4 July 2022) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/jul/04/chris-pincher-a-timeline-of-allegations-and-investigations> accessed 28 August 2024.
[6] UK Parliament Committee on standards, ‘Christoper Pincher – Twelfth Report 2022-23’ (6 July 2023) <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5803/cmselect/cmstandards/1653/report.html> accessed 28 August 2024.
[7] Sorcha Bradley, ‘How Boris Johnson lost the support of his party’ The Week (7 July 2022) <https://theweek.com/news/politics/956973/how-boris-johnson-lost-the-confidence-of-his-mps> accessed 28 August 2024.
[8] House of Commons Committee on standards, ‘Mr. Owen Paterson Third Report of Session 2021-22’ (26 October 2021) 5 accessed 28 August 2024.
[9] Owen Amos, ‘Boris Johnson resigns: Five things that led to the PM’s downfall’ BBC News (7 July 2022) < https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-62070422> accessed 28 August 2024.
[10] House of Commons Committee of Privileges, ‘Matter referred on 21 April 2022 (conduct of Rt Hon Boris Johnson): Final Report’ (15 June 2023) 3 <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/40412/documents/197897/default/> accessed 28 August 2024.
[11] Ibid 40.
[12] Cabinet Office, ‘Findings Of Second Permanent Secretary’s Investigation Into Alleged Gatherings On Government Premises During Covid Restrictions’ (25 May 2022) 8 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1078404/2022-05-25_FINAL_FINDINGS_OF_SECOND_PERMANENT_SECRETARY_INTO_ALLEGED_GATHERINGS.pdf> accessed 28 August 2024.
[13] House of Commons Committee of Privileges, ‘Matter referred on 21 April 2022: Co-ordinated campaign of interference in the work of the Privileges Committee’ (28 June 2023) 3 <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/40679/documents/198237/default/> accessed 28 August 2024.
[14] Based on ‘Change. Labour Party Manifesto 2024’ <https://labour.org.uk/change/> accessed 28 August 2024.
[15] ‘Serving the Country’ in ‘Change. Labour Party Manifesto 2024’ <https://labour.org.uk/change/serving-the-country/> accessed 28 August 2024.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Owen Amos, ‘Boris Johnson resigns: Five things that led to the PM’s downfall’ BBC News (7 July 2022) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-62070422> accessed 9 September 2024.
[20] Tarunabh Khaitan, ‘A Fourth Branch of the State? On Constitutional Guarantors in the UK’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (30th March 2023) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/).
[21] Tarunabh Khaitan, ‘Guarantor Institutions’ (2021) 16 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 40-59.
[22] Tarunabh Khaitan (n 20).
[23] Ibid.
[24] Serving the Country’ (n 15).
[25] Peter Riddell, ‘The unanswered questions posed by Labour’s plan for a new Ethics and Integrity Commission’ The Constitution Unit of UCL (1 July 2024) < https://constitution-unit.com/2024/07/01/the-unanswered-questions-posed-by-labours-plan-for-a-new-ethics-and-integrity-commission/> accessed 8 September 2024.