English devolution has long been presented as decentralising political power. More often, it simply reinforces Westminster’s control. While the Labour Party was elected last year promising to take power away from SW1, early signs are that the Party’s plans for English devolution may have the opposite effect. As long as Westminster retains ultimate discretion over the scope, timing, and revocability of devolved powers, meaningful decentralisation will remain an illusion.
I argue that the history of English devolution is a history of this disguised centralisation, and that Labour needs to plan for a more meaningful redistribution of political power. Without it, wider questions about democratic equality across the UK will remain unanswered.
English devolution in historical perspective
The beginning of devolution in the popular imagination starts with the creation of the devolved Legislatures between 1998 and 1999, that is: the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Notably absent from this, though, is England, and so to begin any account in 1998 is to begin by mirroring the asymmetry of the devolution settlement as it exists today.
Notably, though, England did have versions of devolution in early experiments in regional governance, including with the establishment of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1965. The GLC existed until 1986, when it was famously abolished by then-PM Margaret Thatcher. This was, at least in part, because the GLC threatened Thatcher’s power in government. The Local Government Act 1985 which she brought in devolved the powers of the GLC to London boroughs and other entities, ridding Thatcher of this problematic challenge to her authority and dissipating power among authorities too small to challenge central government. While the GLC’s legacy is contested, a pattern had been established that where a kind of devolution became challenging for central government, it could quickly be overridden.
It would take the election of a Labour government in 1997 to create the Greater London Authority at the start of the millennium, after the Greater London Authority Act 1999 was enacted, and while different to the GLC, the GLA marked a return to a form of meaningful local governance for London as a city. This, however, gave only London comparable powers to the devolved nations of the United Kingdom. The rest of England remained under-served.
Jump forward to 2004 and the Labour Party brought forward a plan for elected regional assemblies in England: the North East England Devolution Referendum. However, the proposal failed to attract popular support and was halted after voters rejected the proposal 78% to 22%. This marked the collapse of the regional assembly model as it was developing and forced a Westminster rethink of the English devolution strategy in general.
That later came to manifest itself as the launch of the various ‘City Deals’ under the Conservative– Liberal Democrat coalition government of 2010 to 2015. Therein, various devolution deals granted cities increased powers over economic development, infrastructure, and skills. These marked the start of a ‘city-region’ focus, rather than one predicated on simple regional devolution.
Jump forward again to 2014, and the first devolution deals and combined authorities came into existence, starting with the Greater Manchester Combined Authority deal. This was the first of several major agreements, paving the way for the metro mayor model which prevails today. In 2017 the first Metro Mayor Elections were held in whcih Andy Burnham became metro mayor for Greater Manchester and Andy Street for the West Midlands. These elections created a new tier of directly accountable local leadership. Other areas, such as the Liverpool City Region and the West Midlands, soon followed, but regardless of who was elected, each of these these deals were asymmetric and negotiated, not legislated.
Clearly, an entirely ad hoc settlement system was unsustainable and in 2022 the Conservative government published a White Paper which sought to formalise the “Level” framework (1 – 4) for devolution and proposed a broader standardisation of powers. It set out long-term ambitions to enable every area of England to reach ‘Level 3’ by 2030. The accompanying English Devolution Accountability Framework (2023) created mechanisms for assessing the performance and governance of devolved institutions. These measures reinforced central oversight while promising clearer local responsibilities.
Into the present
A change of government in 2024 has led us to a new White Paper, published by the government in December, which signals a renewed and notionally ambitious effort to reform English devolution. It promises a national strategy to ensure that all parts of England can access Level 3 or Level 4 devolution by the end of the decade. It seeks to move away from the bespoke, deal-by-deal approach in favour of a more uniform and transparent model, thus addressing long-standing criticisms of asymmetry and opaqueness.
The White Paper also proposes more predictable funding settlements and stronger guarantees of local autonomy, although it stops short of creating a statutory or constitutional guarantee for devolved powers. In doing so, it attempts to blend political pragmatism with advancing constitutional reform, while retaining significant central control over the process and criteria for that advancement. Critics argue that without formal legal entrenchment, though, the reforms still entail executive discretion more than genuine decentralisation.
A core problem of Labour’s offer is that the metro mayor model centralises power in individuals, undermining the development of strong local institutions. While we have seen an increase in high-profile mayors, these individuals nonetheless still operate under centrally imposed limits and lack true autonomy. Crucially, the powers granted to metro mayors are not constitutionally entrenched and can, in certain circumstances, be amended, restricted, or even withdrawn by central government. For example, the Secretary of State may alter the scope of devolved responsibilities or impose performance-based conditions effectively curtailing the authority of local leaders. Financial powers are also vulnerable to recall or reallocation depending on political priorities in Westminster. This model thus follows in a long tradition of Westminster’s dominance over regional autonomy. The approach is a kind of managed-localism, as the centre remains the ultimate manager of the local representatives.
Another challenging aspect of the prososed settlement is the lack of fiscal autonomy it offers the local and combined authorities, who will be deprived of meaningful tax-raising powers. Under the terms of the White Paper, the Treasury will retain control over core funding allocations and authorities must apply for ring-fenced funds, reinforcing the already exhausting bidding culture among local government. This process drastically undermines local strategic autonomy and creates dependence on Westminster. As the Centre for Cities has repeatedly argued, these constraints limit mayors’ ability to innovate or lead regionally tailored development. The Institute for Government similarly notes that without fiscal powers, local leaders remain delivery agents of central policy, not autonomous political authorities. This reflects a broader lack of political will to enact substantive change and real English devolution.
Another structural flaw exacerbated by the proposed form of English devolution, which applies more generally across the UK but which is especially pronounced in England, is the continued concentration of strategic control in Whitehall. Here, the centre determines which regions receive devolved powers in the first place, on what terms, and when. There remains no legal framework entitling local areas to devolution, nor any obligation on the part of the centre to devolve. The Levels 1 – 4 system reflects the whims of central government and its aspirations for the English economy rather than regional need. This issue created by the previous Conservative administration remains in the new Labour White Paper, and demonstrates an general unwillingness to cede power away from Westminster.
However, the most fundamental issue – as mentioned earlier – lies with a system of devolution which is not properly statutorily entrenched. This distinguishes it from Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, and is to the detriment of the English regions. Powers which are granted via statutory instrument, as with the creation of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, often lack the popular legitimacy which comes with specific primary legislation. Beyond this, they remain constrained by the limited terms of previous legislation including the Local Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. Were Labour truly serious about embedding a wider devolution settlement into the fabric of English politics, it would be looking towards wider reaching primary legislation rather than the continuation and expansion of the of our existing approach.
Into the future
English devolution has failed to live up to the rhetoric that surrounds it. Though cloaked in the language of empowerment, it is too-often little more than a rebranded form of central control over local government – conditional, revocable, and opaque. Westminster continues to pull the strings, while local actors are expected to perform with severely limited autonomy. This is not devolution; it is control by limited delegation. The widely celebrated metro mayors may offer a veneer of local leadership, but their powers remain fragile, their funding insecure, and their policy space constrained. It is important to note that Labour have yet to propose anything like the radical reform of their powers which is required. Our metro mayors’ democratic mandate is regularly undermined by central government, and it seems likely this will continue if they vocally challenge central government decisions. More broadly, devolved regions’ ability to shape their own futures remains stunted by fiscal dependence and legal vulnerability.
At present English devolution highlights the fragility and incoherence of the UK’s existing constitutional settlement. English devolution is a bull which must be grabbed by the horns. If it is to become meaningful not just on the statute books but in the popular consciousness, then it must be properly and systematically overhauled, giving mayors and local authorities fiscal and political power exempt from Westminster’s influence.
While Labour’s latest White Paper promises an expanded devolution settlement, the government should surely focus instead on fixing the settlement’s foundations. What England needs is not another policy initiative, but a fundamental shift: from executive patronage to constitutional principle. Until then, devolution in England will remain what it has always been—a centralised state’s performed illusion of reform.
Julius Lobe.
Julius Lobe is a law student at the University of London and a student of governance and public policy at the University of Passau. He was awarded a Constitution Society internship in 2025. He has previously conducted legal advisory work for start-ups at the Universität Passau Law Clinic and held research positions in traffic and insurance law at a law firm. Julius has also worked for an MP of the German Bundestag.
The Constitution Society is committed to the promotion of informed debate and is politically impartial. Any views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and not those of The Constitution Society.