Extremism is the promotion or advancement of an ideology based on violence, hatred or intolerance, that aims to:
- negate or destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms of others; or
- undermine, overturn or replace the UK’s system of liberal parliamentary democracy and democratic rights; or
- intentionally create a permissive environment for others to achieve the results in (1) or (2).1
In March of this year, the then Conservative Government introduced a new definition of extremism, designed to revise the principles set out in 2011’s Prevent strategy. The current definition prohibits “ideology based on violence, hatred or intolerance” that is designed to erode the rights and freedoms of others, undermine the UK’s system of parliamentary democracy and democratic rights, or create an environment to enable others to achieve these goals. It prohibits government and the civil service from lending support to extremists, either by way of funding or in providing any sort of public platform. When it was introduced in the House of Commons, the new definition was said to target Islamist and Far-Right groups, including neo-Nazi groups, while building “greater national resilience and social cohesion” through its application to ideology, as opposed to action.
The impetus for a new definition came following the October 7 Hamas attacks against Israel in 2023, as well as a rise in far-right wing violence. Then Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak condemned what he described as “a shocking increase in extremist disruption and criminality”. The drive for a new definition received significant cross-party support. However, the new definition has been extensively criticised by all sides.
On the one hand, concerns have been raised that the definition may provide scope to limit key human rights, such as freedom of expression. There’s also been concerns that it will be deployed discriminatorily, fuel anti-Muslim sentiment, or as a tool to quell legitimate protest. The previous definition, rooted in so-called “British values” was coopted by far-right organisations, including Neo-Nazis who argued they were not extremist. And while this definition aims to apply to these groups, it is not clear that the new definition actually adds any value in achieving this; it is not statutorily entrenched and the UK’s criminal laws already facilitate prosecution of conduct that is motivated by violence, hatred or intolerance, including in relation to terrorist activity. Significantly, the current definition omits crucial elements that are contained in international law. To this end, the so-called “commonsense” design is arguably open to subjective interpretation, and has the potential to be deployed as a political tool to denigrate political opposition. Thus, rather than achieving its stated goal of promoting social cohesion, the definition has the potential to do the opposite; to fuel intolerance, division and even violence at a time when there are concerns that increasing political polarisation may fuel extremism.
Policing ideas instead of action
The far-reaching and somewhat ambiguous targeting of ideology is criticised as having the potential to police thought and silence dissenting opinions in a way that undermines the democratic ideals of liberalism. The definition lacks built-in safeguards to prevent against the policing of ideas which are either unconventional or strongly held. In applying the new definition, whether an idea is designated extremist may very well turn on the personal opinion of the assessor. For example, on one account Pro-Palestinian protests may be construed as antisemitic. On another, those same demonstrations may be viewed as a legitimate exercise of free association and political expression, protected by the Human Rights Act 1998, the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Similarly, PETA or Just Stop Oil’s ideological stances may be interpreted as promoting intolerance – if opposition to speciesism or climate activism is interpreted as promoting intolerance of human rights or free markets.
In this space, a comparison with the definition of extremism in international law draws out lurking dangers. In 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy designed to combat terrorism and address “conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism”. In 2015, the UN Secretary-General adopted a Plan of Action to Combat Violent extremism. What sets the UN’s definitions apart from the UK’s current definition of extremism is the required nexus between violent extremism and terrorism. Specifically, the 2015 Plan of Action’s key cause of concern is “violent extremism as, and when, conducive to terrorism” (italics added). In a similar vein the EU links ideology to methods in defining extremism. By contrast, the UK’s definition does not require extremist views be linked either to terrorism, violence or indeed any sort of conduct. It is ideology itself – that is, systems of ideas or ideals – that is the target of the UK’s definition. This means that ideologies which are neither violent, linked to terrorism, or even preparatory, may fall within the scope of the definition. For example, a non-violent demonstration in support of Palestine would likely not fall within the definition of extremism under international law. By comparison, turning on who is making the assessment, that same demonstration may come within the UK’s definition of extremism. The power to erode the rights of individuals on the whim of a subjective decision-maker undermines fundamental rule of law principles. The definition’s absence of a conduct element that links violence with terrorism removes necessary human rights safeguards so that mere ideas risk being labelled extremist.
In fact, ideology that is linked with terrorism or violence that would fall within the definition is already broadly covered in domestic criminal laws. The Terrorism Act 2000 criminalises conduct which is used against or used to threaten the government, or is designed to intimidate the public where the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Sentencing Act 2020 s66 criminalises conduct which is motivated by hostility towards race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity. In other words, when ideology is attached to acts which are “based on violence, hatred or intolerance” any related conduct is criminalised. This is consistent with the “golden thread” of the criminal law, which requires proof of a coincidence between the physical elements of a crime with the fault elements, that is, a guilty mind. By comparison, there is no conduct element required to fall within the scope of this definition of extremism. Thoughts and ideas alone are sufficient to satisfy.
A definition that risks causing radicalisation
This thought exercise begins to expose the way the current definition is problematic: Reinforced is the cliched adage, that “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” but in a way that legitimises all world views as equal. The UN definition and the criminal law distinguishes certain ideological views as inherently illegitimate. In contradistinction, the current UK definition of extremism’s subjective analytical framework carves space to designate ideology as extremist based on it being in opposition to current political sentiment. For example, applying either the UN’s definition or domestic criminal laws, ideologies expressed by ISIS or Boko Haram are understood as comprising illegitimate world views. But these ideologies are deemed extremist not just because they are felt to be fundamentally morally wrong, but also due to the way that those ideas motivate terrorist activity. Isolating thought as a target for monitoring by the state potentially slides into the dangerous territory of excessive securitisation and tips any proportionate balance away from human rights protections.
Marking out ideas as extremist – as opposed to those ideas linked to violent conduct – has been argued not only to produce false positives, but may shut down the chance for open dialogue. This chilling impact on free speech may exacerbate the risk of radicalisation. To the extent that the new definition disproportionality targets certain groups, minority identity is constructed as otherness. This can only exacerbate community division by marking out ideological difference as the defining sentiment of political, ethnic or other minority identity, the impact being to increase tensions between different groups. Given that all the definition really does is to attach a label which prevents Government and the civil service from working with those marked out as extremist, the definition may be argued to do more harm than good. And so, rather than successfully targeting the precursors to violent extremism, this sort of reductive labelling has the power to reinforce bigotry in a way that undermines the goals of defining extremism in the first place.
On Tuesday it was confirmed that the Government has dispensed with the services of the now ex-Extremism Adviser Lord Waleny. Let’s hope this inappropriate definition of extremism itself now follows.
Jane Richards.
Jane Richards is a lecturer in international human rights and criminal law at the University of York. She is a fellow at the Centre for Criminology at the University of Hong Kong.
The Constitution Society is committed to the promotion of informed debate and is politically impartial. Any views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and not those of The Constitution Society.
- Government Guidance, New Definition of Extremism (2024), available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-definition-of-extremism-2024/new-definition-of-extremism-2024 ↩︎