“It would really be simpler and more economical to keep a flock of tame sheep and from time to time drive them into the division lobbies in appropriate numbers”[1]
So Christopher Hollis MP notoriously lamented in 1949 because MPs so rarely voted against the party line. However, in recent decades we have seen more high-profile defections and MPs increasingly willing to speak out against their parties. Why are so many MPs in rebellion? Institutional incentives – coupled with new opportunities to exploit social media for personal gain – are fragmenting the flock. As the next general election draws closer, Conservative MPs are increasingly willing to speak out against the Prime Minister, incentivised by the institutional pressures of reelection in first-past-the-post elections. Under first-past-the-post, candidates can benefit from a “personal vote” coming, in part, from an MP’s willingness to go against their party’s line. What are the benefits and drawbacks for the democratic process when MPs seek personal votes? Would the Tories be more unified today under a different electoral system? This blog investigates these questions.
First-past-the-post and the “personal vote”
During elections in which voters cast votes for individuals (rather than a party as a whole) voters can use two different pieces of information to decide how to cast their ballots. First, which party the candidate belongs to and second, the individual characteristics of the candidate themselves. A voter may be relatively indifferent between party platforms but prefer one candidate over another because of the candidate’s individual actions or traits. For example, an MP might have helped a constituent negotiate a tricky application process following a meeting during a surgery or brought up a constituency-specific issue during PMQs. These actions can help to secure a personal vote – votes based on a candidate’s “personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record”.[2] While most voters still choose which candidate they support based on party preference, the relatively small gains coming from personal votes may make all the difference for candidates running in marginal constituencies.
Evidence shows that MPs are more likely to vote against the majority of their party during divisions as their party becomes more unpopular – a 10% decline in party popularity is associated with 2.5% increase in defection.[3] Thus, MPs are more likely to want to create personal reputations and records apart from their party when they face a greater electoral threat. In line with these motivations, we see more Conservative MPs willing to speak out against Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and the Party’s current agenda as it becomes increasingly clear that many will face difficult reelection battles.
Of course, MPs cannot stray too far from the party line without facing consequences from the party itself. MPs seen as too rebellious are less likely to hold cabinet or sub-cabinet positions, limiting the possibilities for career progression. Their party may also allocate fewer resources in terms of both money and time towards the MP’s reelection campaign. At the most extreme, rebellious MPs can face deselection. While deselection remains quite rare, at least four Tory MPs have been deselected for the upcoming election. The more control parliamentary parties have over candidate selection and reselection, the fewer incentives MPs have to cultivate personal votes by rebelling against their parties.
While establishing an independent reputation is one way of gaining personal votes, personal vote seeking does not necessarily require a candidate to contradict their party – there are numerous, and often more common, methods. Evidence shows that MPs in marginal constituencies are more likely to propose more Private Members’ Bills[4] and ask more written questions[5] than MPs that have won election with higher proportions of the vote. Other methods can include holding surgeries, attending local events, or serving on committees relating to constituency-specific issues such as an MP in a rural constituency serving on the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs Committee.
Social media, personal websites, and email lists give MPs the ability to publicise their actions quickly, cheaply, and to a broad audience. These instruments also require little to no funding to maintain, giving MPs an independent way to express their views and promote their records, increasing their ability to gain personal votes.
Other Electoral Systems
Institutional incentives vary across electoral systems, resulting in different propensities for personal vote seeking.
The alternative vote (AV) method, used in elections for the Australian House of Representatives, has voters rank candidates in order of preference, rather than casting a single vote for their most preferred candidate as in the Westminster first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. Because, like FPTP, AV allows voters to cast votes for individuals as opposed to parties, candidates under AV will have similar incentives to seek personal votes as those under FPTP. Indeed, there may be an even greater incentives because candidates gain value from being a voter’s second choice. Personal votes can therefore also be valuable when a voter’s first preference vote is based primarily on party platforms but she has less strong opinions between the party platforms of other parties.
Both FPTP and AV are single member district systems, meaning one candidate is elected from each constituency. Under these systems, a party will only run a single candidate in each constituency to avoid splitting the vote between different candidates from the same party, leading to neither being elected. However, in systems with multimember districts, such as proportional representation or single transferable vote, several candidates from the same party frequently run in the same constituency. Whether multimember district systems encourage personal vote seeking depends on whether voters have the option to vote for individual candidates.
Closed list proportional representation (CLPR) systems do not allow voters to select individual candidates. Instead, voters choose a single party and the party chooses who takes the seats that the party wins. Candidates in CLPR systems have no incentive to seek personal votes because the party completely controls which of its candidates gain seats. Parliaments elected using CLPR, such as Spain and Portugal, should see little to no public dissent between MPs and their party as a whole.
In contrast, open list proportional representation (OLPR) systems, used in countries such as Austria and Greece, allow voters some say in which individual candidates from their preferred party are elected. These systems can create an even greater incentive for a candidate to seek personal votes than in FPTP and AV systems because they must directly compete with members of their own party.[6] With voters unable to determine which candidate to support solely based on a party’s platform, an individual candidate’s personal record and reputation becomes even more important.
The additional member system (AMS) used for the Scottish Assembly and Welsh Senedd allows voters to cast two votes: one in a FPTP tier and another in a CLPR tier, creating different institutional incentives for different candidates. Those running in the FPTP tier can benefit from personal votes but those in the CLPR tier can be damaged by trying to get them. However, many candidates running in the FPTP tier also want to be considered by the party for the CLPR tier, in case they lose their individual races. Thus, the incentives to seek personal votes through rebellion against the party line are significantly decreased.
The Northern Ireland Assembly uses single transferable Vote (STV) – a multimember district system in which voters rank candidates, similar to AV but with multiple candidates elected per constituency. Candidates in STV systems face similar challenges to those under OLPR because they frequently have to compete against members of their own party running in the same constituency, increasing the value of personal votes.
Conclusion
There is no one way to decide which electoral system is “best” for a given country. The choice ultimately comes down to what constitutional designers want from their elected representatives and their legislature as a whole. Strongly unified parties with few to no rebellious MPs give predictability to voters – they can expect their MPs to always follow the party line. Alternatively, a more disunified party can be less predictable but it can also give MPs some wiggle room to tailor their actions to more closely match the preferences of the voters in their constituency. At the same time, too much party in-fighting can damage the party’s reputation as a whole and with it, the electoral prospects of each of its candidates.[7]
With growing public dissatisfaction with the Conservative Party and Rishi Sunak in the UK, Tory MPs will be increasingly concerned regarding their reelection prospects. As such, they may be increasingly willing to speak out against the Prime Minister and the government’s policies. A similar situation is likely amongst SNP MPs as the party loses support from Scottish voters. In contrast, Labour MPs will have considerably less to gain from going against the party line. Labour should therefore present a more unified front than Conservatives in the upcoming election.
Kathryn Wainfan.
Kathryn Wainfan holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has been a lecturer in Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, University of California, Merced, and Loyola Marymount University.
The Constitution Society is committed to the promotion of informed debate and is politically impartial. Any views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and not those of The Constitution Society.
[1] Hollis, C. (1949). Can Parliament Survive?, p. 64. Hollis and Carter.
[2] Cain, B.; Ferejohn, J.; Fiorina, M. (1987). The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence, p. 13. Harvard University Press.
[3] Kam, C.J. (2009). Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics. Cambridge University Press
[4] Bowlder, S. (2010). “Private Members’ Bills in the UK Parliament: Is There an ‘Electoral Connection’?”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 16(4).
[5] Kellermann, K. (2015). “Electoral Vulnerability, Constituency Focus, and Parliamentary Questions in the House of Commons”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 18(1).
[6] Carey, J.M., Shugart, M.S. (1995). “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas”, Electoral Studies, 14(4).
[7] Of course, the level of party unity is only one consideration to take into account. Others include, but are not limited to, minority representation, the ability of voters to get rid of representatives they don’t like, whether small are more able to win seats, and the ease with which voters can understand the electoral system.