Voters in the Republic of Ireland went to the polls in late November. After several rounds of counting in the complex proportional representation system, Fianna Fáil proved the winner, securing 48 of the 174 seats available, ahead of Sinn Féin on 39 and Fine Gael on 38. Negotiations are now progressing over the make up of the next government in Dublin.
Just as significant, though, was that Sinn Féin’s vote dropped 5.5% from the last general election in 2020, with the party attaining the third largest vote share overall despite winning the largest share in 2020. As Fianna Fáil-Fine Gael negotiations progress toward forming a new government, one or the other will lead the next administration. Lacking a viable coalition partner, Sinn Féin has again fallen short in displacing the two more established ‘centre-ground’ Irish political parties.
Government-formation negotiations are expected to conclude by the end of January and will also involve a recently-formed group of eight independent TDs (members of the Dáil Éireann) called ‘the Regional Independent Group.’ Simon Harris, the leader of Fine Gael, has expressed his desire to finalise an agreement prior to the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump on January 20. If this agreement is reached, the outcome will buck the global trend of incumbents being thrown out of office by their electorates.
But what will the newly constituted Irish government in Dublin mean for Northern Ireland, a so-called ‘border poll’ on a united Ireland and the province’s constitutional status in the United Kingdom?
What a new Irish administration means for the UK and Northern Ireland
As the head of the new government, Micheál Martin will first prioritise strengthening all three strands of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (B/GFA). These are East-West (Republic of Ireland and Great Britain), North-South (NI and ROI), and Northern Ireland itself.
Since December 1998 the Stormont Assembly has been suspended on at least eight occasions, or for an estimated 40% of the time it could have been in operation. In recent times, it has been out of service for five of the last seven years.
I know myself from speaking to relatives, friends and to the voters of West Tyrone this summer how frustrating this has been for people in Northern Ireland. The malfunctioning NI Executive has also caused issues with Health Service wait lists (the longest in the UK), infrastructure, pressures in education, housing supply and public sector pay.
Micheál Martin has spoken in recent years about the need to have meaningful conversations among all political parties, civil society and the Irish and British governments about reforming Stormont to make the institutions “more stable and effective… [while] retaining the [B/GFA’s] foundational commitment to meaningful powersharing and inclusiveness.” Martin made these comments at the Alliance Party’s annual conference, and he might well work effectively with the moderate nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) following Fianna Fáil’s three-year partnership with the SDLP. Martin, then, may be able to put positive, constructive pressure on other parties to remove the single-party veto mechanism which has too-often allowed either of the main parties to walk out of government and collapse Northern Ireland’s institutions at a moment’s notice. Polling shows overwhelming popularity for such a move among people in Northern Ireland, but Sinn Féin, the DUP, and the TUV are not yet committed to seeking it.
What a new Irish administration means for a united Ireland
Taking the Irish election results at face value, an observer might conclude that a border poll has moved further into the distance by the failure of Sinn Féin to enter government in the south. However, a closer look shows that the issue is unlikely to fade away in the near term. All major political parties in the Republic of Ireland are in favour of a united Ireland at some stage in the future.
The former (Fine Gael) Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar, who resigned from his role in April, said last autumn that all parties in the ROI should explicitly make Irish unity “an objective, not an aspiration” in their manifestos. The disagreement among the main parties, then, is over strategy and the approach to the question – rather than the principle of it.
While Micheál Martin has said he wouldn’t hold a unity vote in the south if he won the election, his party nonetheless pledged to undertake substantial research on the differences between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland jurisdictions on vital issues concerning the border. While this is a necessary precursor to unification, Fianna Fáil’s position seems to be to prioritise building understanding and reconciliation and to ‘unite the people’, over immediate discussions of a referendum itself. Likewise, Simon Harris’ Fine Gael are supportive of the aim of unity but have been more circumspect about practical commitments to moving towards it.
Meanwhile the Irish Labour Party’s manifesto set out a series of concrete policies to prepare for the potential of a future united Ireland, and the possibility of the referendum being held “within the next decade.” The Social Democrats in turn state that supporting the unification of the island will be an important objective for them were they to enter government, and that any Programme for Government they negotiate “will include deliverable commitments to advancing this project” – for example the creation of a Citizens’ Assembly on Irish unity and the future of the island. If the Social Democrats support a FF-FG coalition, then the new Irish government will be noticeably more committed to achieving Irish unity than its predecessor. For their part, Irish Labour withdrew from coalition government talks before Christmas.It’s also worth mentioning that the Regional Independents Group is aligned in the Dáil with Aontú, the conservative Irish republican party. Aontú campaigned for the next Irish government to agree to an Irish unity referendum to take place by 2030.
Despite this pressure across the political spectrum, though, Irish unity did not feature all that prominently as an issue in the campaign or in the televised debates of the leaders of the three main parties. That’s likely in part because there are political limitations and risks to figures like Micheál Martin and Simon Harris suddenly and overtly making Irish unity a key priority of their administration. There is mixed public polling on support for unification north and south of the border, but there is also a desire from the Irish government to reassure unionists in Northern Ireland that they are not trying to pull the rug from under their feet. Going forward, the new government must balance philosophical support for a unified Ireland with presenting itself as an honest broker and guarantor of the political institutions, and the people, of Northern Ireland.
What approach will Starmer take to Northern Ireland and the ‘new’ Irish Government
The two general elections in the UK and Ireland provide Labour with a moment to choreograph a ‘reset’ in relations with Dublin, and with Brussels.
Keir Starmer’s pro-EU background and experience in holding the Brexit brief for Labour under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership mean’s he’s observed that Ireland has clout in the EU27 on several key issues. Starmer will hope to use improved relations with Dublin as a means to build closer ties with the EU, and even secure negotiation advantages in the forthcoming review of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) in 2025/26. We can expect to see further discussions about the UK’s closer cooperation with the EU, and a strengthening of the bilateral UK-ROI relationship as a result.
The Prime Minister also speaks sincerely about his love of working in Northern Ireland as an adviser to the Policing Board and holidaying in Donegal. His chief of staff is from County Cork, and Morgan McSweeney’s predecessor (Sue Gray) was a publican in Armagh whose father grew up in Fermanagh. Patrick Maguire has observed that Starmerism is a ‘very Irish political project.’
Shortly after being elected, Keir Starmer invited PM Simon Harris to Chequers for a pint of Guinness (and an effectively executed photo opportunity). Most recently, in December, Fine Gael’s Pascal Donohoe invited Rachel Reeves to attend the symbolic Eurogroup meeting of Eurozone Finance Ministers – the first such occasion a UK Chancellor has participated in since Brexit. So, in addition to more substantive bonds, Labour’s PR machine is also eager to emphasise links across the Irish Sea.
Northern Ireland Secretary Hilary Benn will also likely position himself more closely with the re-elected FF-FG led administration than its predecessor. Benn and Micheál Martin met recently at the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference in Dublin in December, and at the Secretary of State’s official residence at Hillsborough Castle following Labour’s election victory in July. Within this growing relationship, Benn’s focus will be on negotiating a long-term fiscal framework in Northern Ireland, implementing the Windsor Framework, on inquiries into Troubles-related incidents like the Omagh bombing and repealing and replacing the last Conservative government’s Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act.
In opposition, the Conservatives’ Alex Burghart has warned nationalist parties like Sinn Féin think Labour “might be a soft touch” in government given that Labour are “much more nervous of being an open advocate for the union.” There are certainly a range of views within the Labour Party, and on the left more broadly, about Northern Ireland’s constitutional future. Labour’s frontbench Northern Ireland team has, though, perhaps as predictably as their predecessors, said a border poll isn’t a priority for them and that there’s no evidence that people in NI wish to hold one.
In Northern Ireland itself, though, the Executive is 25 years old, and for the first time is led by a republican First Minister in Michelle O’Neill. She and her Party are likely to take this historic moment and use it as an opportunity to galvanise the movement for Irish unification. Therein, specifics on the criteria for calling a border poll are not explicitly set out.
These are, ultimately, a decision for the British government of the day. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement provides somewhat vaguely worded conditions that a poll shall be held “if at any time it appears likely…that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.” First Minister O’Neill may attempt to get further clarity on what the conditions for a poll are, then, but it remains a very remote prospect that Hilary Benn triggers a border poll in this Parliament, and unlikely that one is called in the next Parliament either.
Some advocates of a vote have suggested that the key metric is the share of the vote of pro-united Ireland parties in the Westminster, NI Assembly and local elections. There is a world where Sinn Féin and other nationalist parties achieve that majority of the share of the vote in the elections held between 2027 and 2029. The Starmer administration and the likely FF-FG coalition will then face re-election in 2029/30. As a result of this electoral timeline, the forthcoming Dublin government may come to the view that a vote sometime after 2030 is a reasonable timeframe for a border poll. This would give the British government a monumental decision to make.
Perhaps influencing this decision might be changes to the voting franchise in any Northern Ireland border poll. The UK government was, of course, elected on a manifesto pledge to reduce the voting age to 16 for all UK elections, and support for Irish unity tends to be strongest among younger voters.
Despite these predictors, experience of the Scottish Independence Referendum and its aftermath has shown that support for these campaigns can ebb and flow dramatically over time, and in response to external events. Sinn Féin’s steady, resilient support north and south of the border will ensure the issue stays on the agenda in Ireland, at any rate, but whether the electoral math is as predicted in five years times remains an open question.
Regardless, the role smaller parties in the Republic will play in the new administration may determine the vigour with which any Dublin government pursues near-term planning for a new future united Ireland. That could have significant consequences for the constitutional future of Northern Ireland, and that means that all eyes at 10 Downing Street will be watching the government formation negotiations in Dublin closely to see what impact they will have on the future.
Stephen Lynch.
Stephen Lynch is a political commentator who has written for the Irish News, the Daily Telegraph and New Statesman about Irish politics, north and south. He stood as a candidate for the Conservative and Unionist Party in the 2024 UK general election, and writes in a personal capacity.
The Constitution Society is committed to the promotion of informed debate and is politically impartial. Any views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and not those of The Constitution Society.