The Facts
On Saturday, 12 April 2025, Parliament was recalled to enact “emergency legislation” conferring upon the Government powers take control of British Steel’s blast furnaces in Scunthorpe, to prevents its Chinese owners from shutting the plant down. This legislation gave the Government the power to order raw materials to keep the blast furnaces running. In addition to claiming that the Government sought to “save British Steel”, both the Business Secretary, Jonathan Reynolds, and the Prime Minister, Sir Kier Starmer, emphasised the importance of saving and protecting the jobs of over 2,700 workers employed in Scunthorpe. Constitutionally speaking, both the decision to recall Parliament on a Saturday and fast-track legislation are highly abnormal. The last time that Parliament was recalled to sit on a Saturday was in 1982, amidst the outbreak of the Falkland war. The last time legislation was expedited was on 30 December 2020 when the EU (Future Relationship) Bill was passed within day by both Houses. Given these extraordinary measures, analysing the Steel Industry (Special Measures) Act 2025 (hereafter “Steel Industry Act”) is important. As is highlighting the fact that it contains “disguised legislation”, the use of which is not subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
The Law
The text of the Steel Industry Act both as introduced to Parliament, and as enacted remained the same. The Act is five pages long, and contains 10 provisions, just over half of which are substantial. Its key provisions confer upon the Secretary of State powers to direct a steel undertaking (i.e. a steel plant) if production is to be ceased, and powers to require any person or entity to comply with certain measures for the purposes of giving effect to the direction. In fact section 2(3) confers upon the Secretary discretionary power to make directions, for the purpose of securing the continued use of specific assets, if it is within the public interest and if this asset has either ceased to be used or is at risk of this.
Under section 2(4) of the Act the Secretary of State is explicitly permitted to use a direction for a range of only vaguely described measures, such as requiring assets to be used in specific ways or requiring the steel undertaking to take, or not take, specific steps. Section 2(5) does not define “specific steps” in any exhaustive way, but states that this might include requiring certain agreements to be signed, appointing certain officers, or exercising management functions in a specific way. The breach and enforcement of direction is dealt with by section 3, which allows the Secretary to “do anything for the purpose of securing the continued and safe use of specified assets that the steel undertaking itself could do.” In short, these two provisions confer upon ministers virtually unrestrained powers to seize and run a privately owned steel enterprise, subject to public or parliamentary scrutiny, provided they regard it as being in the public interest.
Constitutionally speaking, the use of such “direction” is contentious, as it is not legislation. Unlike Statutory Instruments, directions do not undergo any automatic process of parliamentary scrutiny, debate or approval. Since such directions are technically guidance with some legal effect, they have been described by two parliamentary committees as “disguised legislative instruments.” The Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee have argued that their use is both “a contradiction in terms” and “never justified” because it allows ministers to make de facto law which is not scrutinised by Parliament or the public. Although the terms of an Enabling Act can impose constraints on the powers to make directions – and even a bespoke requirement for some parliamentary review – in this case, the Steel Act does not require the use or content of directions to be subject to any parliamentary scrutiny. Apart from requiring the Secretary of State to give notice of a direction, the exercise of the powers under section 2 are not subject to any real limits or process-related requirements either.
This is particularly egregious for accountability because failing to comply with a direction under the Steel Act amounts to a criminal offence (s.4(1)). As the Law Commission has consistently argued, creating a new criminal offence is constitutionally significant and requires a high level of democratic legitimacy and transparency – neither of which was guaranteed on 12 April.
What Happened in Parliament?
Although the Steel Industry Bill was debated in both Houses, it was not subject to much scrutiny, nor did the process lead to the introduction of any later legal requirements for parliamentary debate or approval. The Bill was published less than two hours before the parliamentary debates began. The Commons debate took less than three hours and began with the Secretary of State, Jonathan Reynolds, claiming that the legislation was temporary, and that he “did want these powers a minute longer than is necessary.”
Reynold’s statement does not seem persuasive given that no amendments were enacted, even though the House of Lords had given the Government options for different kinds of safeguards. Five amendments were originally to be moved in the House of Lords, four of which would have led to a much a more accountable process. Lords Hunt and Davies jointly introduced two possible amendments, both of which attempted to sunset either the Act as a whole or the power to issue directions. Baroness Coffey proposed an amendment requiring the Secretary of State to issue a report every six months to both Houses which would both justify and explain the status of, and the need for, the Act, while Lord Fox and Baroness Brinton proposed a separate procedure which would have required the Minister to table a motion in both houses to debate the continuing necessity of the Act.
The debate in the House of Lords lasted for a total of under four hours. Initially, Peers were highly critical of the scope of powers being delegated, the absence of safeguards, and the fact that the Government had not clarified the policy being implemented. Lord Moyle, for one, described the Bill as “remarkable” not merely because for the possible nationalisation, but because any Government could enforce “confiscation and control of a private company”, which could be carried out without accountability. For another, Lord Hunt focused his fire on the ambigious nature of the Act itself and government policy. He criticised the “standard vagueness of “all options are on the table”” for failing to provide certainty to both the taxpayer and workers, who deserve clarity about their future. As a result of these objections, the Minister, Baroness Jones, committed to “making sure that Pariament is updated on these matters” every four sitting weeks and that a more substantial debate would occur before October on both the operation of the Act and on the Government’s evental policy. As a result of these concessions, none of the four amendments that were meant as safeguards were voted on. Only one amendment – clarifying the meaning of a “steel undertaking” was both moved and agreed to. In other words, the House of Lords did manage to ensure that the Government promised report to Parliament on how the Act would be used and on the substance of government policy, but it did not secure any legal requirement for parliamentary accountability. As the Lords Constitution Committee argued a few days ago, it remains unclear why these plans were not included in the Bill itself.
Justifying the Absence of Safeguards
Previous governments have relied on a number of justifications for fast-tracking legislation, including the need to ensure stability in Northern Ireland, to address economic crises, security concerns, or a rapidly spreading pandemic. But even the powers under the Coronavirus Act 2020 were subject to a sunset clause. In this case, the Government has given reassurances that both the exercise of the powers under the Act and its policy – once finalised – will be scrutinised in Parliament, but there is no real guarantee. Once again, we are depending on the good faith of political actors submitting to Parliament, rather than the Government pro-actively ensuring the principle of executive accountability to Parliament is protected in the legislative process and policymaking.
Tasneem Ghazi.
Tasneem is a PhD student at the UCL Faculty of Laws. Tasneem previously completed the Barrister Training Course while working part-time as a research assistant at the Constitution Unit. In 2021, she interned at the Institute for Government and at the UK in a Changing Europe. Tasneem holds an MA in History from King’s College London, and an LLB in Politics, Philosophy and Law.
The Constitution Society is committed to the promotion of informed debate and is politically impartial. Any views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and not those of The Constitution Society.