We are delighted to announce that the winner of the 2025 Constitution Society Essay Prize is Alexander Stricklin, Balliol College, Oxford. This year’s competition saw an incredibly high standard of submission from students across 17 institutions, reflecting the breadth and strength of budding constitutional scholarship in our universities. We warmly congratulate our two shortlisted runners-up, Ayush Mukherjee, Queen Mary University of London and Nanditha Dileep, Worcester College, Oxford, for their excellent contributions. The Society also extends its sincere thanks to Haus Publishing for their generous support of the prize, and to our judges, Professor Andrew Blick, Professor Aileen McHarg and Sir Richard Mottram. The winning entry by Mr Stricklin is posted in full below.
To what extent is the Ministerial Code an effective control over ministerial behaviour?
1. Introduction
The Ministerial Code is a non-legally binding document outlining standards of conduct for government ministers, encompassing duties of honesty, integrity, accountability, alongside a broader range of ethical and procedural obligations. Originally a confidential circular, the Code has, since its publication in 1992, acquired a more prominent role as both a symbolic declaration of ethical governance and a practical guide for ministerial behaviour. Yet this duality – aspirational in principle but operational in practice – has generated persistent controversy, setting high expectations whose enforcement remains contingent on political circumstances.
This essay argues that the Ministerial Code, when considered in isolation, is a largely ineffective control over ministerial behaviour. While it formalises ethical expectations and provides a benchmark against which ministers can be judged; its effectiveness is significantly constrained by its reliance on prime ministerial discretion, lack of enforceability and its ambiguity.
However, when assessed within the UK’s wider constitutional landscape, the Code’s effectiveness is significantly enhanced. It works synergistically within Parliament’s wider accountability framework, working alongside ‘internal’ mechanisms such as Parliamentary Committees while empowering ‘external’ mechanisms like democratic accountability. Moreover, many limitations of the Code reflect a principled compromise with core features of the UK’s constitution, subsequently promoting key principles which indirectly shape ministerial behaviour. Accordingly, this essay argues that, although ineffective in isolation, the Ministerial Code becomes highly effective when considered within its wider constitutional context.
2. The Nature, Purpose, and Legal Status of the Ministerial Code
“A document that is not just rules and guidance, but a statement of values”[1]
Keir Starmer’s foreword to the 2024 Ministerial Code highlights its dual character: an internal ‘soft-law’ tool for regulating ministerial behaviour and an external symbol of ethical governance. The interplay between these two roles underpins many of the code’s perceived strengths and weaknesses.
2.1 The Internal Role: Soft Law and Prime Ministerial Dominance
Prior to its formal publication in 1992, the Code existed as a set of private expectations issued by the Prime Minister. This internal, informal nature reflects salient features of the UK’s political constitution as identified by Griffith[2], favouring flexibility and political accountability over rigid legal constraints. Two principal features emerge from this.
Firstly, the Code operates as a form of ‘soft-law’, defined by Cini as “rules of conduct which… have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects”[3]. In establishing behavioural expectations which are enforced in line with the Prime Minister’s discretion, breaches of the Code do not trigger automatic sanctions, meaning compliance and enforcement depends on a spectrum of (political) incentives, as recognised by Creyke and McMillan[4] – generating two significant weaknesses.
- Enforcement is vulnerable to political expediency. As the Code’s enforcer, the Prime Minister may act in line with personal or party interests; seen by Theresa May’s refusal to enforce collective responsibility in 2019 in her recognition of the fact her minority government could not afford to lose party support[5]. This created ambiguity regarding the importance of collective responsibility due to the Code’s inconsistent enforcement, whilst its non-application undermined its deterrent effect.
- Political strength can further weaken enforcement. When political costs of not enforcing the code become less significant, other political considerations may triumph over the proper application of the code; seen by Boris Johnson’s refusal to act after his Independent Adviser found that Priti Patel, who was popular amongst the conservatives’ grassroots, had breached the Code in 2020. The Code’s soft-law character thus ties its effectiveness to the political context – significantly reducing its effectiveness as a result.
These issues are compounded by a second feature of the Code: prime ministerial dominance. Affirmed in FDA v Prime Minister6, the Prime Minister is the ‘ultimate arbiter’ of breaches. Whilst logically coherent – only the Prime Minister can determine loss of confidence – this centralisation consolidates interpretive authority within a single political figure. Johnson’s personal denial of wrongdoing during the Partygate scandal, for instance, exemplifies how political self-interest can subvert institutional oversight and undermine the Code’s normative clarity.
2.2 The External Role: Political Symbolism and Public Accountability
In contrast to the Code’s internal role, its ‘external role’ developed more explicitly with its 1992 publication as the “Questions of Procedure for Ministers” (‘the QPM’), part of John Major’s broader effort to restore public trust in government. In this capacity, the Code functions as a symbolic commitment to ethical and transparent government.
Resulting from this outward-facing role as a political symbol, the Code has increasingly incorporated abstract, aspirational values; most notably the Nolan Principles – selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership. While laudable, their inclusion sacrifices practical enforceability due to their conceptual vagueness in exchange for stronger political messaging.
This contributes significantly towards one key inefficiency in the Code’s ability to control ministerial behaviour: its clarity. Owing to its quasi-legal ‘soft-law’ nature, the Code must be clear and unambiguous so as to meaningly inform ministerial behaviour, consistent with Dicey’s articulation of the rule of law[6] and Lord Diplock’s jurisprudence[7]. Yet in spite of this, the Code has accepted the trade-off between clarity and political messaging and has become more ambiguous, and thus ineffective, as a result.
For instance, Section 1.1 mandates ministers “uphold the highest standards of propriety”. Whilst rhetorically powerful, “highest standards” provides no measurable, objective standard with which to practically assess ministerial behaviour: an issue exemplified by its inconsistent applications to Amber Rudd in 2018 and Boris Johnson in 2022. Whilst the ‘highest standards’ threshold was applied to mean Rudd ‘ought to have known’ she was misleading Parliament, when self-applied by Johnson it was construed to mean ‘did actually know’ – sparing him from immediate procedural consequences. This highlights how ambiguities in the Code’s language can lead to its inconsistent application, undermining its clarity and subsequent effectiveness.
2.3. Key Features Emerging from the Code’s Dual Nature: Ineffective in Isolation.
Taken in isolation, therefore, the Ministerial Code is largely ineffective in controlling ministerial behaviour. Whilst capable of controlling ministerial behaviour as a formal set of expectations with the potential for tangible consequences; its ‘soft-law’ nature leaves enforcement hostage to political expediency and prime ministerial discretion, while its external role sacrifices clarity for political messaging. These elements form a Code which, though influential in shaping expectations, lacks the institutional robustness to function as a reliable check on ministerial behaviour on its own.
However, these very features that limit its impact in isolation also render it effective within the UK’s broader constitutional framework, where parliamentary scrutiny and democratic pressures transform its symbolic authority into tangible consequences. It is to this wider context that this essay now turns.
3. The Ministerial Code in its Wider Constitutional Context
When judged as a component of a broader, polycentric framework of accountability mechanisms; the Ministerial Code becomes a much more effective control over ministerial behaviour – an effectiveness enhanced by the Code’s ability to indirectly control ministerial behaviour by upholding key features of the UK’s constitution.
3.1 An Effective Tool Within Parliament’s Wider Accountability Framework
As Brazier notes[8], accountability in the UK is plural and overlapping. No single mechanism suffices; instead, ‘internal’ and ‘external’ mechanisms operate collectively to constrain ministerial behaviour. Within this framework, the Ministerial Code functions not as a freestanding control, but as an authoritative tool which amplifies the effectiveness of its surrounding mechanisms
Internal accountability mechanisms, defined as institutional features which scrutinise ministerial behaviour, work synergistically with the Code in controlling ministerial behaviour. Using the Code as a reference point for misconduct, the Code is used as a tool to indirectly control ministerial behaviour by Parliamentary Committees; a key example being the Commons Privileges Committee’s 2022 inquiry into Boris Johnson’s misleading of Parliament which generated substantial pressure, leading to his resignation. Although Johnson had sidelined the Independent Adviser, the Code guided committee investigation: showing how even when its formal enforcement procedures are suppressed, the Code works alongside other ‘internal’ accountability mechanisms to control ministerial behaviour.
Beyond Parliament, ‘external’ accountability mechanisms interact with the Code in a similar manner. ‘External’ accountability mechanisms are those which aren’t institutionally established but represent an equally significant dimension of ministerial accountability – such as media or public scrutiny. These enhance the force of the Code, contributing to the detection of breaches and pressurizing subsequent enforcement, whilst the Code bolsters public investigation and scrutiny, enhancing democratic accountability.
For instance, investigative reporting into the conduct of Priti Patel and Micheal Fallon culminated in their resignations after they were found to have breached the code. In both cases, the Code served as a foundational ethical reference for public scrutiny, while public pressure compelled enforcement. This synergy between the Code and other accountability channels underscores its effectiveness within a broader accountability framework.
3.2. Reflections on the UK’s Political Constitution: Indirectly Effective
Lastly, the Code’s effectiveness arises from its deference to the UK’s constitutional principles. It relinquishes direct legal control – remaining non-justiciable and centred on Prime-Ministerial discretion – to increase its indirect control over ministerial behaviour. This is done through the preservation of existing constitutional principles, as well as the enhancement of others.
Firstly, the Code’s concessions to constitutional principles preserve their force in controlling ministerial behaviour. This argument rests on the idea that the Code’s limitations preserve constitutional principles, which in turn help regulate ministerial behaviour; by upholding these principles, the Code ensures it does not weaken overall oversight of ministers. For instance, the Code’s soft-law status preserves the principle of parliamentary accountability – a key feature of the British constitution according to Webber[9] and Griffith[10] – by keeping responsibility for conduct in the political, rather than legal sphere – avoiding the ‘judicialization of politics’ as identified by Hirschl[11].
Furthermore, the Code enhances other constitutional principles, such as democratic accountability or collective cabinet responsibility, improving its indirect control over ministerial behaviour. Democratic accountability is improved through the Code’s authoritative list of expectations, as discussed in section 3.1, while collective cabinet responsibility is reinforced through the codification of the principle and the Prime Minister’s discretion in enforcement, which keeps accountability internal to government, encouraging ministers to maintain a united public front rather than appealing to external regulators.
As a result, much of the Code’s direct ineffectiveness represents a constitutional choice: it upholds constitutional norms which empower scrutiny, raises costs of misconduct, and, taken together, constrain ministerial behaviour indirectly but effectively.
4. Conclusion
In isolation, the Ministerial Code is largely ineffective in controlling ministerial behaviour: it lacks enforceability, clarity, and depends too heavily on prime ministerial discretion. Yet many of these limitations represent necessary concessions to key principles of the UK’s political constitution, where accountability primarily lays within the political, not legal sphere.
The Code’s real effectiveness therefore lies in its relationship with Parliament’s wider accountability framework. It not only strengthens the channels of control offered by constitutional principles such as Parliamentary or democratic accountability; but it reinforces its surrounding institutional and external accountability mechanisms through its authoritative, symbolic standards for ministerial conduct.
Situated in this wider constitutional context, therefore, the Code becomes a highly effective control: not as an isolated constraint, but as a constitutional mechanism which shapes expectations, frames political debate, and sustains the culture of accountability essential to ministerial responsibility.
Alexander Stricklin.
The Constitution Society is committed to the promotion of informed debate and is politically impartial. Any views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and not those of The Constitution Society.
[1] Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code (6/11/2024)
[2] Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1
[3] M Cini, ‘From Soft Law to Hard Law? Discretion and Rule-making in the Commission’s State Aid Regime’ (2000) Working Paper 35, European University Institute.
[4] See discussion on ‘incentives’ within a ‘soft-law’ context: Robin Creyke and John McMillan, ‘Soft Law versus Hard Law’ in Taggart (eds), Administrative Law in a Changing State: Essays in Honour of Mark Aronson (Hart 2008) 378-383
[5] Lewis Lloyd, ‘The Brexit Effect’ (Institute for Government, 3/2019), 10 6 [2021] EWHC 3279 (Admin)
[6] AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Constitution, Ch1 ‘(The Nature of Parliamentary Sovereignty’)
[7] Lord Diplock, Black-Clawson International v Papierwerke AG [1975] UKHL 2
[8] Alex Brazier, ‘Memorandum by the Hansard Society’ (Select Committee on the Constitution, 2003) < https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldconst/68/68we34.htm> accessed 14/8/2025
[9] Gee and Webber, ‘What is a political constitution?’ (2010) 30 OJLS 273
[10] Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1
[11] Hirschl, Ran, ‘The Judicialization of Politics’, Robert Goodin (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Science (2011)